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NO. 7 FEBRUARY 2019 Introduction 
Syria: Too Fragile to Ignore 
Military Outcomes, External Influence and European Options 
Volker Perthes 
For the last eight years, almost all geopolitical, ideological, and sectarian conflicts of 
the Middle East have converged in Syria. Syria is not at peace today, but the govern-
ment of Bashar al-Assad – with more than a little help from Russia and Iran – has won 
the war against the armed anti-regime opposition. The political opposition is largely 
marginalized. The Arab states are about to normalize their relations with the govern-
ment in Damascus. Russia and Iran are the main external power brokers. The US mili-
tary withdrawal from Syria will also reduce its political influence. The European Union 
and its member states will have to come up with a policy of their own to deal with the 
new reality in Syria. For Europe, Syria is too close – and too fragile – to ignore. 
 
Diplomats love to reiterate that there is 
no military solution to the conflict in Syria. 
Although this is true, there have been un-
deniable military outcomes, most notably 
the defeat of the main opposition and rebel 
groups. The Islamic State (also referred to 
as ISIS or Daesh) has also lost almost all the 
territory it had controlled in the country, 
but it remains a veritable terrorist force. 
Some areas are still outside government 
control: The so-called Idlib de-escalation 
zone in the north has survived thanks to a 
Turkish-Russian arrangement but is likely 
to return to the government sooner or later, 
probably gradually rather than as a result 
of a major offensive. This is particularly 
so since Turkish-backed rebels have been 
defeated and most of the area has been con-
quered by “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) – 
a rebel alliance led by the former Nusra 
Front, a Syrian offshoot of al-Qaeda that 
is seen internationally as being fair game 
in the fight against terrorism. Turkey has 
no strategic interest in helping this group 
to control the area. Ankara seems intent, 
though, to maintain its hold and that of its 
own Syrian allies over a strip of territory 
between the Turkish province of Hatay and 
the Euphrates River. 
The territory east of the Euphrates is 
still – as of the time of writing – con-
trolled by the armed wing of the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), the domi-
nant force within the so-called Syrian 
Democratic Forces. Without the support 
of US troops, however, the PYD will not be 
able to maintain its semi-autonomy in this 
area. For the PYD, it does not matter much 
whether the US drawdown comes quickly 
or happen slowly. They have learned that 
the US presence is finite, whereas the 
Syrian state and Turkey are not going away. 
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Given the choice of facing a Turkish inva-
sion or seeking an arrangement with the 
government in Damascus, the Kurdish 
group will certainly opt for the latter by 
trying to secure some form of meaningful 
decentralization and an integration of its 
own militia into the state’s armed forces. 
Most likely, therefore, Damascus will re-
establish control over the cities and oil 
fields in the east and over the Syrian-Iraqi 
border within the next couple of months. 
Discussions between the United States, 
Turkey, and others about a “security zone” 
along the eastern part of the Turkish-Syrian 
border have, so far, not produced any tan-
gible outcomes. Russia has a strong interest 
in seeing Syrian state authority return to 
this area, and Turkey needs Russia’s con-
sent if it wants to maintain its hold over 
Syrian territory west of the Euphrates. We 
can therefore assume that direct Turkish 
control in the region east of the river will 
be restricted, at most, to a narrow strip of 
land. Most likely, Syrian government troops 
will move close to the border, and there 
will be some presence by Russian troops 
to provide against unintended incidents. 
Post-war Realities 
The future of Syria will no longer be 
decided on the battlefield, nor in UN-led 
political negotiations in Geneva. The new 
UN Special Envoy for Syria may be able 
to form a Constitutional Committee with 
representatives from the government and 
the political opposition as well as legal 
experts and societal leaders who are un-
controversial enough for Turkey, Russia, 
and Iran to agree upon. It is very unlikely, 
however, that the Assad government would 
allow the adoption of any constitutional 
text that could seriously limit the powers 
of the president and the security apparatus. 
The post-war reality of Syria will none-
theless only partly resemble Syria before 
the war. Absent unforeseen events, Assad 
will remain in power even after the next 
presidential elections, now logged for 2021. 
He will be ruling a devastated country, 
however: Syria’s economy is down to roughly 
50 percent of its pre-war performance. More 
than a quarter of the Syrian population 
have become refugees abroad; another quar-
ter or so have been internally displaced. 
Syria’s social fabric has been severely dis-
rupted, as many of the better educated have 
been driven into exile, and war profiteers 
have been able to acquire property and 
positions. The government is not eager to 
have the bulk of the refugee population 
come home. Parts of the former rebel-held 
areas find themselves under de facto occu-
pation by the security apparatus, with no 
guarantees for returnees or for those who 
have stayed during and after rebel rule. It is 
rather unlikely that local or external actors 
will be held accountable for war crimes and 
the up to 500,000 Syrian war deaths. 
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Russia and Iran 
Given its dependence on Russia and Iran, 
the Syrian government has also de facto 
lost much of its sovereignty. Moscow has 
become the most – and Iran the second 
most – important powerbroker in Syria. 
Both will likely maintain a military pres-
ence and military bases as well as a strong 
level of influence inside the political and 
security apparatus. Although they have 
been able to manage their differences quite 
successfully, their strategies for post-war 
Syria are not congruent: Iran sees Syria as 
a forward base for what Iranian strategists 
call their deterrence posture against Israel. 
To consolidate its influence, Iran seems 
intent to ingrain itself more deeply into the 
military-political-ideological and economic 
fabric of Syria. Russia, in contrast, is neither 
interested in such a form of Iranian hegemo-
ny in Syria, nor in further regional esca-
lation. Moscow aims at reconstituting a 
stable, closely allied, and internationally 
accepted government in Damascus. For that 
purpose, Russia is pursuing an ambitious 
agenda that includes ongoing military stabi-
lization efforts, the constitutional process, 
military reform, local reconciliations, the 
return of refugees, economic reconstruc-
tion, and the prevention of a major Israeli-
Iranian military confrontation in Syria. This 
is more than Russia can shoulder itself, and 
it is more than it can do with its own pre-
dominantly military means. Moscow has 
therefore been asking for support from 
Europe and the rest of the world, particularly 
to finance the country’s reconstruction. 
European Choices 
The impending military withdrawal of the 
United States from Syria will also reduce 
Washington’s diplomatic influence over 
Syria-related developments. This increases 
the need for Europe to develop a common 
policy on how to deal with Syrian realities. 
Even before the US made the decision to 
leave, it was the right thing for Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel 
Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the 
presidents of Russia and Turkey, thereby 
making an effort to at least avoid further 
international polarization over Syria. It 
remains to be seen whether such a format 
can lead to a modicum of international 
coordination. It is certainly important to 
make the attempt. The EU states and Russia 
do not share the same interests in Syria: 
Whether to support the stabilization of 
authoritarianism or instead seek some form 
of transformation toward better, more in-
clusive governance at least, is not only an 
ideological question. It denotes both dif-
ferent attitudes with regard to stability, 
human security, and change, as well as 
different time perspectives – more short-
term or more long-term ones. But much 
of what Russia is trying to achieve in Syria 
today, after its victory, is not incompatible 
with European interests – certainly if com-
pared with the Iranian agenda. 
The EU and its members may not like 
the military outcome, but they recognize it. 
They are no longer demanding a transitional 
government or a power-sharing arrange-
ment in Damascus. They are right to sup-
port the efforts of the UN and UN aid 
agencies. This cannot replace a European 
strategy for Syria, however, which after all 
is a fragile state in Europe’s neighborhood. 
Essentially, Europe will have to decide 
whether to leave international responsibil-
ity for Syria to the Astana group – Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey – or to engage. 
There are no ideal options with regard to 
reconstruction – but reconstruction is the 
one significant lever Europe has. The EU, 
along with international financial institu-
tions and wealthy Arab states, cannot sim-
ply provide the financial means for a Rus-
sian, Iranian, and Syrian-government led 
reconstruction effort. Europe does not want 
to support a repressive regime that, after all, 
is responsible for the vast majority of the 
war dead and most of the destruction. Nor 
should it help to further enrich war profi-
teers and regime cronies who have already 
come up with grandiose plans to “develop” 
and change the demography of devastated 
former rebel-held neighborhoods. 
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At the same time, Europe needs to 
realize that the Syrian people, particularly 
in war-damaged towns and suburbs, are 
in dire need of support. These populations 
have been harmed in multiple ways, not 
only through physical destruction. Many 
of their youth are in exile, imprisoned, or 
dead. They have mostly lost the support of 
Western and Arab donors who had sup-
ported social infrastructure and services in 
these areas as long as they were under op-
position control. The government does not 
prioritize support for these people but treats 
them as defeated enemies. A lack of recon-
struction would not only leave former oppo-
sition-held areas in unacceptable humani-
tarian conditions but indeed create the breed-
ing ground for a resurrected IS or “IS 2.0.” 
Rights, Protection, Access: 
A Focused Approach toward 
Reconstruction 
Europe should communicate to Russia, 
and thus to the Syrian government, that it 
is prepared to contribute toward the recon-
struction in Syria in a conditioned approach 
based on three elements: rights, protection, 
and access. Or, more concretely, based on 
a modicum of rule of law and civil rights, 
including the rights of returnees and 
refugees to their property and freedom; 
protection of the most vulnerable, such as 
displaced persons, children, detainees, or 
those who have been vanquished in the 
war; as well as access for international 
organizations, NGOs, and diplomats to the 
people and areas in need. The more pro-
gress there is with regard to these elements, 
the more support that could be made avail-
able. Support would principally go to the 
most needy areas in Syria: the towns and 
neighborhoods most seriously damaged, 
such as Aleppo, Homs, and the Damascus 
suburbs, but also Raqqa, which has been 
left heavily destroyed after the US-led cam-
paign to oust the IS from the city. 
Support should not be channeled through 
government ministries but through inter-
national NGOs and UN agencies, which, 
in turn, will work with municipalities and 
local NGOs, employ local people, and there-
by also be able to monitor progress and 
make sure that disbursements actually 
reach people and places in need. This will 
lead to a slower disbursement of funds and 
to more small-scale projects – including 
low-income housing, schools, and medical 
infrastructure – than a process led by the 
government or by private developers who 
enjoy presidential or government patron-
age. But it is likely to be more effective. 
Neither the Syrian government nor Iran 
will welcome such an approach. Russia, 
however, which actually is demanding 
European reconstruction support for Syria, 
would understand, and probably even 
appreciate it. 
Does this mean ignoring the Syrian gov-
ernment? No. As the regime seems to be 
there to stay, European states need official 
and unofficial channels of communication 
with it. Diplomatic relations are not a re-
ward for good behavior. Most EU states and 
the EU itself have not cut diplomatic ties 
but rather reduced or withdrawn their 
personnel. They should now find a com-
mon line on how to reestablish political 
contacts with Damascus, but avoid a rush 
toward full normalization as long as no 
serious domestic reconciliation and no 
implementation of the core elements out-
lined above are in sight. A diplomatic pres-
ence, however, even at lower levels, can 
improve access, allow for a realistic assess-
ment of the situation and may, at times, 
help to solve humanitarian or other prob-
lems. And it would demonstrate to the 
people in Syria that the international com-
munity is not indifferent to what happens 
in their country. 
Dr Volker Perthes is Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Executive Chairman of 
SWP. From September 2015 to September 2018 he was also a Senior Advisor to the UN Special Envoy for Syria. 
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